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1 Introduction
Competition leads to better quality when prices are regulated. This is a fairly robust prediction
from economic theory.1 ,2 Given that the regulated price is above the marginal costs, firms
have an incentive to invest in quality in order to attract (or avoid losing) consumers. Tougher
competition — measured for instance by the number of competing firms or by the degree of
substitutability among products — amplifies the incentives to invest in quality. A prime example
of regulated industries we are thinking of is health care. A further example is education. In
both these fields, the consumer choices are mainly driven by considerations on quality rather
than price.
In theoretical models, the positive relationship between competition and quality in regulated
markets is generally derived within a static framework, neglecting potentially important dynamic
issues related to quality. In particular, static models make the following two assumptions: (i)
quality can be adjusted instantaneously (and permanently) by the providers; and (ii) demand
responds immediately to quality changes. Brekke, Cellini, Siciliani and Straume (2008) address
the first assumption by treating quality as a stock variable, moving over time in response to
investments. They find that if the marginal provision cost is increasing, competition is less
relevant in enhancing quality, as compared to the findings of static models.
In the current paper, we address the second (static) assumption by allowing for sluggish
demand responses to (changes in) product quality. If a provider increases quality, sluggish
demand implies that it will take some time before the potential demand increase is fully realised.
Such demand sluggishness can typically arise for two diﬀerent kinds of reasons. First, imperfect
information on the demand side, which is particularly relevant in markets where quality is the
main competition variable: while prices usually are easily and immediately observable, quality
is often less readily observable and much more diﬃcult to measure. Second, sticky behaviour of
consumers, motivated by (personal or familiar) habits, or by trust or confidence in one specific
1See, for instance, the survey by Gaynor (2006) and references therein. See also the papers by Ma and Burgess
(1993), Wolinsky (1997), and Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006). See also Lambertini (2006) for theoretical
analyses of vertical diﬀerentiation in industrial organization.
2 If firms can set prices as well, the eﬀect of competition on quality is in general ambiguous. In this case,
competition depresses prices and, thus, the marginal revenues from quality investment (see e.g., Economides,
1993).
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provider. Let us think, for example, of the cases of persons who choose a dentist simply because
relatives went to him/her; or a child going to a specific school (or college) simply because brothers
went there. Moreover, the relational content in the service exchange between a provider and a
consumer in fields like education or health play an important role in making demand sluggish.
Our basic framework is the widely-used Hotelling model for quality competition with reg-
ulated prices.3 In this model there are two firms oﬀering one product each. We consider the
case in which the spatial locations are given, while the products are horizontally and vertically
diﬀerentiated, and the firms choose quality to maximise profits. First, we derive the static qual-
ity equilibrium as a benchmark. Second, we extend the model to a dynamic framework with
sluggish demand. Sluggish demand is modelled such that at each point in time only a fraction
of consumers respond to quality changes. Thus, it will take some time before potential demand
is fully realised. The time it takes for potential and actual demand to align is determined by
the degree of demand sluggishness.
We use a diﬀerential game approach to analyse dynamic competition between the two firms.4
There are two main solution concepts. First, we derive the open-loop solution, where each firm
commits to an optimal (quality) investment plan at the initial period. This solution is reasonable
if it is very diﬃcult or costly to obtain information about competitors and/or the quality variable
is subject to some rigidity (e.g., investment regulations). Second, we derive the (feedback) closed-
loop solution, where each firm knows the quality of the competitor at each point in time, not
just the initial state. Here, firms choose an optimal rule connecting the current value of their
choice variable to the current value of states; hence, the feedback closed-loop solution can be
interpreted as a more competitive solution in the sense that firms can at each point in time
change their investments in response to the dynamics of the states.
A first finding is that the quality steady-state levels under both open-loop and closed-loop
are lower than in the static equilibrium. The main reason is that in a dynamic game, firms
take future profits into account, resulting in less aggressive competition. In addition, sluggish
demand dampens competition even further, since shifting consumers becomes more costly the
3See, for instance, Ma and Burgess (1993), Calem and Rizzo (1995), Wolinsky (1997), Lyon (1999), Del Rey
(2001), Beitia (2003), Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007), and De Fraja and Landeraas (2006).
4See Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long and Sorger (2000) for an introduction.
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more sluggish demand responds to quality changes. Moreover, if marginal costs are increasing,
we show that quality is lower in the closed-loop than the open-loop solution. This is somewhat
surprising, since the closed-loop solution often is considered as the more competitive solution
concept, given that firms can set the choice variables in each point in time.5 The reason is
that quality choices are strategic complements when marginal costs are increasing, which in a
dynamic game provides an incentive to compete less aggressively.6 Otherwise, if the marginal
costs are constant, quality choices become strategically independent, and the two solutions -
open-loop and closed-loop - coincide.
Our comparative dynamics results are, however, very much in line with the findings derived
within the static framework. We show that both higher prices and lower transportation costs
(less horizontal diﬀerentiation) lead to higher quality in steady state. In addition, we also find
that less sluggish demand increases the steady state quality level. Note that one can interpret
lower transportation costs and less sluggish demand as tougher competition. Thus, in line with
static models, we report a positive relationship between competition and quality.
A second finding is that demand and quality move in opposite directions over time on the
equilibrium path to the steady state, given that marginal costs are increasing in production.
This result contradicts the static relationship between quality and demand. Consider a situation
where actual demand is below the steady-state level. In this situation, the provider will raise
quality to a level above the quality steady-state level. However, as demand increases, the
marginal profit gain becomes lower due to increasing marginal costs, and the provider will
gradually reduce quality until the steady-state is reached. As a result, we obtain a negative
relationship between (actual) demand and quality. This result might have implications for
empirical studies. Unless suﬃcient care is taken to account for dynamic adjustment over time,
this kind of equilibrium dynamics could potentially lead to spurious relationships between quality
and demand.
5 In dynamic capital accumulation games the closed-loop solution is typically more competitive (see Dockner,
1992; Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long and Sorger, 2000). In these models, providers compete a la Cournot but
face capacity constraints that can be relaxed by capital accumulation through investments. It turns out that
investments under the closed-loop solution is higher than under open-loop.
6This result has clear parallels to price competition, where a repeated game might result in more collusive
outcomes than one-shot games.
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Finally, we briefly consider welfare and policy implications. First, we show that first-best
quality always can be attained. This is not surprising since we have one instrument (the price)
and, due to symmetry, one variable (quality) to manipulate. Second, we show that more high-
powered incentives (i.e., higher regulated prices) are required if providers use dynamic rather
than static decision rules. Finally, we point out that demand sluggishness might be aﬀected by
regulatory policy as well. The regulator might spend resources on publishing quality indicators
of the providers. If this is the case, then reducing demand sluggishness is a policy substitute to
providing high-powered incentives.
We believe our analysis is relevant for several regulated industries. A prime example is
health care. In this industry prices are either set by the insurer (government or private insurer)
or settled in negotiations with the providers (hospitals and physicians). Consumers (patients) are
insured against medical expenditures, so non-price measures like quality and distance are more
relevant for provider choice than price.7 Since health care providers typically receive payments
per patient (or per treatment), they might find it profitable to improve quality to attract (or
avoid losing) patients and, in turn, increase revenues.8
Another example is the market for (especially higher) education. In most European countries,
tuition fees play a negligible role, and funding of educational institutions is to a large extent
based on student attendances.9 A student’s choice of school or university is typically based
on the quality of the institution, as well as the institution’s location (geographically and/or in
product space). As for hospitals, universities might find it profitable to invest in quality (new
facilities, better laboratories, hiring of top researchers, etc.) in order to attract more students,
thereby increasing revenues.10
In both health care and education, quality is a major concern. In recent years, most Eu-
7The empirical studies by Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Tay (2003) show that distance and quality are
the main predictors of hospital choice. These papers also assess the relationship between competition and quality
in the US Medicare hospital market.
8Related theoretical studies on competition in health care are, for instance, Calem and Rizzo (1995); Lyon
(1999); Gravelle (2000); Gravelle and Masiero (2000); Beitia (2003); Nuscheler (2003); Brekke, Nuscheler and
Straume (2006, 2007); and Karlsson (2007).
9See Kaiser, Raymond, Koelman and van Vught (1992) for an overview.
10For related theoretical studies in education, see papers by Del Rey (2001), De Fraja and Ioassa (2001), and De
Fraja and Landeras (2006). For empirical studies on competition and quality in education, see e.g., Dee (1998),
Epple and Romano (1998) and Hoxby (2000).
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ropean countries have implemented marked-based reforms exposing providers to competition.
In particular, the introduction of provider choice and activity-based payments are aimed at
stimulating competition and in turn quality. In both sectors, governments spend resources on
collecting information on quality indicators and publishing scores and rankings of institutions
(e.g., league tables of hospitals, universities, schools, etc.). Obviously, the purpose of this activ-
ity is to make demand more responsive to quality diﬀerences. Our purpose is to contribute to
the understanding of the impact of competition on quality in regulated markets characterised
by demand sluggishness.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the model framework. In
Section 3, we briefly present — as a benchmark for comparison — the equilibrium of an equivalent
static model, before we derive and characterise the equilibrium quality under the open-loop
solution (Section 4) and the feedback closed-loop solution (Section 5). In Section 6 we briefly
mention some welfare and policy implications, while Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
In line with previous literature on quality competition in regulated markets, we conduct the
analysis within a Hotelling framework (Hotelling, 1929). Consider a market with two providers
located (exogenously) at either end of the unit line S = [0, 1].11 On this line segment there is a
uniform distribution of individuals, with total mass normalised to 1. We assume unit demand,
where each individual demands one unit of output. The utility of an individual who is located
at x ∈ S and chooses provider i, located at zi, is given by
U (x, zi) = v + kqi − τ |x− zi| , (1)
where v is the gross valuation from consumption, qi ≥ q is the quality at provider i, k is a
parameter measuring the (marginal) utility of quality, and τ is a transportation cost parameter.
11S is typically interpreted either as a geographical space or a product (taste) space. Note that we assume
exogenous locations, with distance equal to one.
6
The lower bound q on quality represents the minimum quality providers are allowed to oﬀer.12
For simplicity, we set q = 0. Moreover, we normalise the marginal utility of quality to one,
i.e., k = 1, without loss of generality. This implies that τ can be interpreted as the marginal
disutility of travelling relative to quality. Thus, a low (high) τ means that quality is of relatively
more (less) importance to the patient than travelling distance.13
Since the distance between providers is equal to one (exogenously fixed), the individual who
is indiﬀerent between provider i and provider j is located at D∗, given by
v − τD∗ + qi = v − τ (1−D∗) + qj , (2)
yielding the notional (or potential) demand for provider i,
D∗ =
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
, (3)
implying that the provider with a higher quality has a potential demand in excess of 1/2. Notice
how lower transportation costs make it less costly for consumers to switch between providers,
increasing the demand responsiveness to changes in quality.
In the existing literature, it is typically assumed that demand responds instantaneously to
quality changes. This is obviously a simplifying assumption. Demand is generally sluggish.
If a provider increases quality, sluggish demand responses imply that it will take some time
before the potential demand increase is fully realised. Such demand sluggishness can typically
arise from imperfect information on the demand side, which is particularly relevant in markets
where quality is the main competition variable. While prices usually are easily and immediately
observable, quality is often much more diﬃcult to measure and thus less readily observable. For
example, assume that, at each point in time, only a proportion γ ∈ [0, 1] of consumers become
aware of quality changes in the market. This would imply that, at each point in time, only a
12We can think of q as the minimum quality level set by a regulator and/or defined through legislation. If q < q,
the provider might be sued or lose his licence. In health care, we can think of q < q as malpractice or failure to
meet licence standards.
13 In the context of hospital competition, there is strong empirical evidence showing that distance and quality
are main predictors of patients’ choice of hospital, see, e.g., Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Tay (2003).
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fraction γ of any potential change in demand is realised. A diﬀerent set of reasons why demand
is sluggish has to do with personal or familiar habits in fields like education or health: people
trust in one specific provider, for personal or familiar considerations, apart from the objective
quality of the service; sticky behaviour, and in some cases even addiction to a specific provider,
lead to sluggish demand.
Define D(t) as the actual demand of provider i at time t (as opposed to potential demand
D∗(t)). Analytically, the law of motion of actual demand is given by
dD(t)
dt
≡
.
D(t) = γ(D∗(t)−D(t)), (4)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is an inverse measure of demand sluggishness. The higher is γ, the less sluggish
is demand. If γ = 0, the demand facing each provider is completely inelastic, as actual demand
does not respond to quality changes, while, if γ = 1, potential demand changes are immediately
and fully realised. Such a specification is widely used in theoretical IO models to describe market
price stickiness (see, e.g., Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; Cellini and Lambertini 2007; Dockner
et al., 2000, for literature reviews).
Since total demand is inelastic, notice that both providers face the same dynamic constraint,
given by (4). To see this, notice that actual demand for provider j at time t is given by 1−D(t)
(as opposed to potential demand 1−D∗(t)). Analytically, the law of motion of actual demand
for provider j is then given by
d[1−D(t)]
dt
= γ [(1−D∗(t))− (1−D(t))] , (5)
which can easily be rewritten as (4). Thus, the dynamics of the demand for provider i automat-
ically determines the demand for provider j.
We assume that providers maximise profits. The instantaneous objective function of provider
i is assumed to be given by
πi (t) = T + pD(t)− C (D(t), qi (t))− F, (6)
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where p is a regulated price per unit of output provided (for example, a treatment or a patient
in the context of health care markets; a student in the context of education markets).14 T is a
potential lump-sum transfer (or a fixed grant/budget) received from a third-party payer.
On the cost-side, each provider i faces a fixed cost F and variable cost C(·) that depends on
the quality qi and the actual demand D. We assume that C(·) is increasing and convex in both
quality and output: Cqi > 0, Cqiqi > 0, CD > 0 and CDD > 0. We also make the simplifying
assumption that the cost function is separable in quality and output: CDqi = 0.
15
Defining ρ as the (constant) preference discount rate, the provider’s objective function over
the infinite time horizon is
+∞Z
0
πi (t) e−ρtdt.
In reality, providers may not have an infinite-time horizon, but may have reasonably long finite
horizons. If the optimal path does not diﬀer significantly from the solution with a very large but
finite horizon, the convenience of working with an infinite-horizon model may be worth the loss
of realism (see Léonard and van Long, 1992, p. 285). Also, when decision-makers retire, they
may well be replaced by other decision-makers with similar utility functions, thus generating an
infinite-time horizon.
In this type of dynamic models with strategic interactions — i.e., diﬀerential games — there
are two main solution concepts: a) open-loop solution, where each provider knows the initial
state of the system and then nothing else, i.e., each provider knows the initial quality (and
thus potential demand) of the other provider, but not in the following periods; b) closed-loop
solution, where each provider knows the initial state of the system, but also later knows the
state variable values, i.e., each provider knows the quality of the other provider, not only in
the initial state, but also in all of the subsequent periods. Within the closed-loop solutions,
further distinctions can be made: if one assumes that players take into account only the initial
14As long as prices are fixed, whether payments are collected directly from the consumers (as for public utilities)
or from a third-party payer (which is more relevant for health care and, to a certain extent, education markets)
is immaterial for our results.
15The assumption of cost separability between quality and quantity is widely used in the related literature (see,
e.g., Economides, 1989, 1993; Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Lyon, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero, 2000; Nuscheler, 2003;
Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume, 2006, 2007). Relaxing the cost separability assumption should not qualitatively
aﬀect our results as long as CDD > |CDqi | .
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state and the current state, the ‘memoryless’ closed-loop solution is obtained; if players take
into account the whole history of states, the ‘perfect state’ closed-loop is obtained; finally, if
players in each instant take into account the current value of states (i.e., the whole past history
is summarised by the current value of states), the feedback rule is obtained. If the rule (i.e., the
function) connecting the choice variable to the states is stable over time, the strategy is said to
be Markovian. Typically, the feedback closed-loop Markovian solution is obtained based on the
Bellman equation.
In order to establish which is the most appropriate solution concept, it is essential to evaluate
the relevant information set used by players when they take their decisions. In cases where
collection of information over time is diﬃcult, it is reasonable to model the choice according to
the open-loop rule;16 on the contrary, when players can observe the current state of the world
and they behave accordingly, the closed-loop rules are more appropriate. Clearly, closed-loop
solutions are more appealing, but solving for closed-loop is more diﬃcult. However, in some cases
— and health care markets can be a good example — players might have to commit to investment
plans and stick to them for long periods of time. In this case, the open-loop solution might
be the relevant one. Nevertheless, there is a wide range of problems where the two solutions
coincide.17 Below, we compare the closed-loop and open-loop solutions. After briefly presenting
the benchmark static analysis in Section 3, Section 4 provides the open-loop solution, while
Section 5 provides the closed-loop one, under the specific rule of feedback behaviour.
3 Benchmark: Static analysis
As a benchmark for comparison, let us briefly derive the Nash equilibrium outcome of a static
version of the model. Using the demand function in (3), the profits of provider i are given by
πi = T + p
µ
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
¶
−C
µµ
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
¶
, qi
¶
− F. (7)
16One example from the education sector could be the Research Assessment Exercise in the UK, that produces
quality profiles of higher education institutions every 8 years. Arguably, with a time span of this length, quality
becomes observable only quite rarely.
17Games where this coincidence arises are presented in Clemhout and Wan (1974); Reinganum (1982);
Mehlmann and Willing (1983); Dockner, Feichtinger and Jørgensen (1985). See also Mehlmann (1988), Fer-
shtman, Kamien and Muller (1992), Dockner, Jørgensen, Van Long, Sorger (2000, ch. 7) for review.
10
The first-order condition for a profit-maximising choice of quality is given by
p− CD
2τ
− Cqi = 0. (8)
Suppose that the cost function is quadratic in quality and output:
C(D, qi) =
θ
2
q2i +
β
2
D2. (9)
The first-order condition then becomes,
p− β
³
1
2 +
qi−qj
2τ
´
2τ
− θqi = 0, (10)
which, in the symmetric equilibrium, yields
qSA =
p− β2
2τθ
. (11)
The comparative statics properties of (11) are intuitive, and well known from the theoretical
literature: equilibrium quality is increasing in the price, p, and decreasing in the transportation
cost parameter, τ . This implies that increased competition, which is typically modelled as a
reduction of transportation costs, will increase the supply of quality in equilibrium. Obviously,
equilibrium quality is also decreasing in the cost parameters β and θ .
4 Open-loop solution
Consider now the dynamic version of the model, where the providers use open-loop decision
rules. Provider i’s maximisation problem is given by
Maximise
+∞Z
0
πi (t) e−ρtdt,
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subject to
.
D(t) = γ(D∗(t)−D(t)), (12)
D(0) = D0 > 0. (13)
Let μi(t) be the current value co-state variable associated with the state equation. The current-
value Hamiltonian is:18
Hi = T + pD −C (D, qi)− F + μiγ
µ
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
−D
¶
, (14)
The solution is given by (a) ∂Hi/∂qi = 0 , (b)
.
μi = ρμi − ∂Hi/∂D, (c)
.
D = ∂Hi/∂μi, or more
extensively:
γ
2τ
μi = Cqi , (15)
.
μi = μi (ρ+ γ)− (p− CD) , (16)
.
D = γ(
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
−D), (17)
to be considered along with the transversality condition limt→+∞ e−ρtμi(t)D(t) = 0. The second
order conditions are satisfied if the Hamiltonian is concave in the control and state variables
(Léonard and Van Long, 1992).19
Totally diﬀerentiating (15) with respect to time we obtain γ2τ
.
μi = Cqiqi
.
qi, or, after substitu-
tion, γ2τ (μi (ρ+ γ)− (p− CD)) = Cqiqi
.
qi. Using μi = Cqi
2τ
γ , we obtain
.
qi =
Cqi (ρ+ γ)− γ2τ (p−CD)
Cqiqi
, (18)
which, together with (17), describe the dynamics of the equilibrium.
As to possible steady state, setting
.
qi = 0 and totally diﬀerentiating yields
∂D
∂qi
| .qi=0 = −
Cqiqi (ρ+ γ) 2τ
γCDD
< 0. (19)
18The indication of time (t) is omitted, to ease notation.
19This is the case since (a) Hqiqi = −Cqiqi < 0; (b) HDD = −CDD < 0; (c) HDDHqiqi > (HDqi)2 or
CDDCqiqi > 0.
12
The locus of quality,
·
qi = 0, is negatively sloped. The second locus, assuming symmetry,
is
.
D = 0, or D = 1/2. In the steady state each provider has half of the market since the
equilibrium is symmetric.
The dynamics of investment and quality can be represented in matrix form as follows (as-
suming symmetry and third order derivatives equal to zero):
⎡
⎢⎣
·
q(t)
·
D(t)
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣
(ρ+ γ)
0
γ
2τ CDD
Cqq
−γ
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣
q(t)
D(t)
⎤
⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎣
− γ
2τ p
Cqq
γ
2
⎤
⎥⎦ , (20)
where the 2-by-2 matrix is the Jacobian J of the dynamic system. As for the dynamic properties
of the system, suppose that this is evaluated around the steady state. Then, it is immediate to
check that the Jacobian matrix J in (20) is such that tr(J) = ρ > 0, and det(J) = −γ (ρ+ γ) <
0, implying that the equilibrium is stable in the saddle sense. The solution is described in Figure
1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Let Ds = 1/2 be the steady state level of demand. Suppose we start oﬀ steady state at a level
where the initial demand is low: D (0) < Ds. One possible interpretation is the case of a provider
who at time 0 enters a previously monopolistic market. The solution is then characterised by
a period of increasing demand and decreasing quality. Notice that the optimal solution for the
‘incumbent’ is precisely the opposite and it is equivalent to the case where the demand is high
(D (0) < 1/2 ⇐⇒ 1−D (0) > 1/2). For this provider, we should observe a period of decreasing
demand and increasing quality. These dynamic patterns establish our first main result:
Proposition 1 On the equilibrium path to the steady state, demand and quality move in opposite
directions over time if the marginal cost of provision is increasing.
In the next section, we will show that the above result holds also when the players use
closed-loop decision rules. Notice that the result holds only if the cost function is strictly convex
in output.
To grasp the intuition behind Proposition 1, it is useful to consider, as a benchmark for
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comparison, the special case of constant marginal cost of output, CDD = 0, implying that the
quality locus is horizontal at the steady state level of quality, qs. In this case, if D (0) 6= 1/2, the
two providers will immediately set their qualities at the steady state level, qs, and maintain this
quality level at all times. The demand dynamics, (17), will then eventually bring demand to the
steady state level, Ds = 1/2, with the speed of adjustment depending of the degree of demand
sluggishness. The reason is that, with constant marginal cost of output (and fixed prices),
marginal profits (∂πi/∂qi) are independent of output. Thus, the profit-maximising choice of
quality is qs irrespective of demand, and each provider will therefore keep quality at this level
at each point in time.
On the other hand, when the cost function is strictly convex in output, CDD > 0, marginal
profits depend on actual demand. More specifically, for a given level of quality, the marginal
profit gain of higher quality is monotonically decreasing in the actual demand facing the provider,
since new consumers are increasingly costly to serve. Thus, if a provider faces actual demand
D < Ds, he will set quality q > qs. As demand increases along the equilibrium dynamic path,
the marginal profit gain of quality decreases; consequently, the provider will gradually reduce
quality until the steady state level is reached. Obviously, the inverse logic applies for D > Ds.
We believe that the result in Proposition 1 has potential implications for empirical analyses
of the eﬀect of quality on demand and, in turn, of the relationship between competition and
quality. In addition to the opposite movement of quality and demand over time, notice that, at
a given point in time, a comparison of the two providers — oﬀ the steady state — unambiguously
predicts a negative relationship between quality and demand. Thus, it is tempting to speculate
that this type of equilibrium dynamics could potentially lead to spurious relationships between
quality and demand in empirical studies, unless suﬃcient care is taken to account for dynamic
adjustments over time.
Let us also briefly consider some comparative dynamics in the open-loop solution. Suppose
the system is in an initial steady state. Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of an unexpected increase in
price or reduction in transportation costs (more competition). The locus
·
qi = 0 shifts upwards,
generating a positive jump in quality. Notice that there is no overshooting. The quality jumps
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to the new steady state value; analytically, this is because the locus
·
D = 0 is a vertical line,
rather than positively/negatively sloped.
[Figure 2 about here]
4.1 Example
Suppose that the cost function is quadratic in quality and demand and given by (9), as in the
static analysis benchmark. With this specification, the solution of the Hamiltonian system leads
to
.
qi =
θqi (ρ+ γ)− γ2τ (p− βD)
θ
(21)
In the steady state we have
.
qi = 0, which, combined with Ds = 1/2, yields
qOL =
Ã
1
1 + ργ
!Ã
p− β2
2τθ
!
. (22)
The results are reasonable and intuitive. If the price is above the marginal cost, then lower
transportation costs (τ) or a higher price (p) increase quality. Similarly, a higher marginal cost
of quality (β), a higher marginal cost of provision (θ) or a higher time preference discount rate
(ρ) reduce quality. Steady state quality is also decreasing in the degree of demand sluggishness
(measured by γ−1). Comparing with the equilibrium quality level in the static analysis, (11), we
also see that the two solutions coincide if ρ → 0, as expected. For ρ > 0, though, the dynamic
open-loop solution yields a lower level of steady state quality. Notice also that this diﬀerence in
equilibrium qualities is increasing with the degree of demand sluggishness.
5 Closed-loop solution
We might intuitively expect that quality under the closed-loop solution will be higher than
under the open-loop solution because competition is more intense when the players use closed-
loop decision rules. However, this is not the case, as the following will show.
Assuming that the cost function is given by the quadratic form in (9), the dynamic decision
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rules in the closed-loop solution are given by:20 ,21
qi = φi(D) =
γ
2τθ
(α1 + α2D) (23)
and
qj = φj(D) =
γ
2τθ
(α1 + α2(1−D)) , (24)
where22
α1 =
p+ γα22
¡
1− γα22θτ2
¢
γ + ρ− γ24θτ2α2
> 0, (25)
α2 = −
2θτ2 (ψ − 2γ − ρ)
3γ2
< 0, (26)
and
ψ :=
r
(2γ + ρ)2 +
3βγ2
θτ2
. (27)
The quality diﬀerence at each point in time is thus given by
qi − qj =
γα2
θτ
µ
D − 1
2
¶
. (28)
The first observation we want to highlight is the negative sign of α2, implying a negative
relationship between demand and quality over time along the equilibrium dynamic path. Thus,
as previously mentioned, the result reported in Proposition 1 carries over to closed-loop case,
and the intuition is equivalent to the one given in the previous section, for the open-loop case.
Once more, notice that this result holds only when the cost function is strictly convex in output,
as α2 = 0 if β = 0.
Applying the steady state condition Ds = 1/2 to (23)-(24), steady state quality in the
closed-loop solution is equal to
qCL =
Ã
1
1 + ργ −
γα2
4θτ2
!Ã
p− β2
2τθ
!
. (29)
20To ease notation, we continue the practice of dropping time indications.
21The full derivation of the closed-loop solution is given in the Appendix.
22The positive sign of α1 is explicitly confirmed in the Appendix.
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Comparing the steady state equilibria of the open- and closed-loop solutions, we see that,
if marginal production costs are constant (β = 0), implying α2 = 0, the open- and closed-loop
solutions coincide: qCL = qOL. Otherwise, if the cost function is strictly increasing in output
(β > 0), implying α2 < 0, steady state quality is lower in the closed-loop solution. The reason
for the coincidence result is related to the previously discussed implication of constant marginal
production costs, namely that the profit margin becomes independent of output. This implies an
absence of strategic interaction between the two players that causes the two solution concepts to
coincide. From (23)-(24), it is straightforward to verify that the optimal dynamic decision rules
imply that each player sets quality at the steady state level at every point in time, irrespective
of the quality chosen by the other player.
However, with increasing marginal production costs (β > 0), a quality increase by provider
i will increase the profit margin of provider j, making qualities strategic complements.23 Under
closed-loop feedback behaviour, this creates a dynamic incentive for each provider to reduce
quality in order to induce future quality reductions — a strategic response — from the competing
provider. Thus, the closed-loop solution yields a less competitive outcome in the steady state.
The comparative statics properties of the closed-loop solution is qualitatively similar to the
open-loop case. It is relatively straightforward to show24 that more competition — measured
either by less demand sluggishness or lower transportation costs — will increase steady state
quality. However, the strength of the quality responses to increased competition diﬀer. We can
measure the relative quality response to an increase in competition by the following elasticities:
ηγ :=
¯¯¯¯
∂q
∂γ
γ
q
¯¯¯¯
, (30)
ητ :=
¯¯¯¯
∂q
∂τ
τ
q
¯¯¯¯
. (31)
23This can easily be verified by inserting the expression for D into (23)-(24), establishing a positive relationship
between qi and qj (when α2 < 0) at each point in time in the optimal dynamic decision rules.
24See the Appendix for the details of the calculations.
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Inserting the steady state levels of quality from the two solutions yields
ηOLγ =
ρ
ρ+ γ
; ηCLγ =
ρ (2γ + ρ+ 5ψ)
ψ (4γ + 5ρ+ ψ)
; (32)
ηOLτ = 1; η
CL
τ =
(2γ + ρ)2 + (4γ + 5ρ)ψ
ψ (4γ + 5ρ+ ψ)
. (33)
It is fairly straightforward to verify that ηOLγ > ηCLγ and ηOLτ > ηCLτ for all parameter con-
figurations. Thus, an increase in competition — either through less sluggish demand or lower
transportation costs — will have a stronger (weaker) impact on quality if the players use open-loop
(closed-loop) decision rules.
The following Proposition summarises the most important steady state characteristics of the
open- and closed-loop solutions:
Proposition 2 (i) If the marginal cost of provision is constant, then
qSA > qOL = qCL.
(ii) If the marginal cost of provision is increasing, then
qSA > qOL > qCL.
(iii) Less sluggish demand and/or lower transportation costs will increase the steady state
level of quality under both solution concepts:
∂qOL
∂γ
> 0;
∂qCL
∂γ
> 0;
∂qOL
∂τ
< 0;
∂qCL
∂τ
< 0.
(iv) The positive impact of increased competition on quality is weaker in the closed-loop
equilibrium:
ηOLγ > η
CL
γ ; η
OL
τ > η
CL
τ .
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6 Welfare and policy implications
First-best quality in the steady state is derived by maximising (instantaneous) aggregate con-
sumer utility net of quality and provision costs. With the quadratic cost function, (9), the
maximisation problem is given by
max
qi,qj
Z 1
2
+
qi−qj
2τ
0
(v + qi − τx) dx+
Z 1
1
2
+
qi−qj
2τ
(v + qj − τ (1− x)) dx
−
2X
k=1
θ
2
q2k +
β
2
µ
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
¶2
+
β
2
µ
1
2
+
qj − qi
2τ
¶2
,
yielding
qi = qj = qFB =
1
2θ
, (34)
which implies D = 1/2.
With competition along only one dimension, namely quality, the first-best steady state level
of quality can always be implemented by appropriate choice of the regulated price, p. Since
equilibrium quality is monotonically increasing in the price, under all solution concepts, the
optimal price in the steady state is such that
pSA =
β
2
+ τ < pOL = pSA +
τρ
γ
< pCL = pOL − α2γ
4θτ
. (35)
Thus, if players use dynamic decision rules of the closed-loop type, more high-powered incentives,
in the form of higher regulated prices, are necessary to induce first-best quality in the steady
state.
A policy maker could also take measures to reduce demand sluggishness, for example by
developing and publishing frequently updated quality indicators that will increase consumers’
awareness of quality diﬀerences in the market.25 Notice that this is a policy substitute to high-
powered incentive schemes (i.e., high prices). The less sluggish demand is (i.e., the higher γ is),
the lower is the optimal price.26
25The publication of hospital and school ‘League Tables’ in the UK are examples of such policy measures.
26From (35) we immediately see that pOL is decreasing in γ. It is relatively straightforward to show that the
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the impact of competition on quality in a market with regulated
prices and sluggish demand. The basic model is the widely used Hotelling model where products
are horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated. We have considered the case in which the spatial
locations are exogenously fixed, while firms choose quality. We first derive the familiar static
quality equilibrium as a benchmark. We then extend the model to a dynamic game, where
demand responds to quality changes with some degree of sluggishness, implying a divergence
between actual and potential demand (out of steady state). We would like to stress that our
assumptions fit quite well with the features of markets with regulated price - let us think of
education or health: the spatial locations of providers are given; competition among providers
is based mainly on the product quality; prices play a limited role in the competitive process; the
consumer behavior is characterised by a certain degree of stickiness.
Using a diﬀerential game approach, we have derived the open-loop and the closed-loop solu-
tions. In the open-loop solution, each provider knows the quality of the competitor in the initial
state, and chooses the time path of quality eﬀorts at the beginning, and then stick to this plan
for the whole length of the game. In the closed-loop solution, each provider knows the quality
of the competitor, not only in the initial state, but also in all subsequent periods, and thus can
choose the quality eﬀort in each point of time, possibly responding to quality changes by the
competitor. Specifically, we have found the feedback closed-loop Markovian solution, in which
the current choice of each player depends on the current value of the state variables.
The analysis has provided three main findings. First, we showed that if marginal costs are
increasing, there is a negative relationship between quality and demand oﬀ the steady state,
which is contrary to the static relationship. The reason is that the marginal profit gain is
decreasing in quality. Second, we found that both the open-loop and the closed-loop steady-state
level of quality are lower than the quality level in the static equilibrium. The reason is that firms
take into account the impact on future profits, and thus compete less aggressively in a dynamic
setting compared to a one-shot game. Third, we showed that if marginal costs are increasing,
same is true for pCL.
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then the closed-loop solution results in lower quality than the open-loop solution. If marginal
costs are constant, the two solutions coincide. The reason is that under increasing marginal
costs, quality choices are strategic complements, while under constant marginal costs, they are
strategically independent. Thus, when firms can observe (and respond to) the competitors’
quality at any time period, and quality choices are strategic complements, competition will be
less intensive.
Based on the dynamic outcomes, we briefly discussed welfare and policy implications. We
showed that the regulator needs to provide more high-powered incentives (higher prices) when
firms use dynamic rather than static optimisation rules. More interestingly, forcing firms to
stick to time plans (i.e., to adopt open-loop rules in terms of diﬀerential game theory) requires
smaller incentive eﬀorts to reach first-best quality, as compared to the situation in which firms
can set their choice in each point of time, observing the state of the world. Moreover, if demand
sluggishness could be aﬀected by the regulator, for instance, by public disclosure of quality
indicators, then this would be a policy substitute to high-powered incentives.
We find this analysis relevant for several regulated industries, especially health care and
education. In these markets, quality is a major concern, and prices are less crucial for choice
of provider. Many European governments have introduced (elements of) competition in health
care and education in order to stimulate quality. In the US competition has been in place for
many years. Recently, we have seen a trend in both the US and in Europe towards publishing
quality rankings (league tables) of hospitals, universities, schools, etc. Obviously, this is done to
stimulate demand responses to quality diﬀerences. The purpose of our paper has been to analyse
the impact of competition on quality in regulated markets when demand is not responding
instantaneously to quality diﬀerences. Hopefully, our analysis can shed some light on the recent
reforms in health care and education.
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Appendix. The closed-loop solution
With the quadratic cost function given by (9), provider i’s instantaneous objective function
is
T + pD − θ
2
q2i −
β
2
D2 (A1)
in which time index is suppressed to ease notation. Eq.(A1), together with the linear dynamic
constraint, (4), gives rise to a linear-quadratic problem. Hence, we define the value function of
provider i as
V i(D) = α0 + α1D + (α2/2)D2, (A2)
implying
V iD(D) = α1 + α2D. (A3)
Notice that α2 < 0 is required to ensure concavity of the value function.
The optimal investment strategies are functions of actual demand at each point in time.
Thus, we define qi = φi(D) and qj = φj(D). We are focusing on Markovian strategies.27 The
value function has to satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which, for provider
i, is given by
ρV i(D) = max
½
T + pD − θ
2
q2i −
β
2
D2 + V iDγ
µ
1
2
+
qi − qj
2τ
−D
¶¾
. (A4)
Maximisation of the right-hand-side yields −θqi + V iD
γ
2τ = 0, which, after substitution of V
i
D
from (A3), yields
qi = φi(D) =
γ
2τθ
(α1 + α2D) . (A5)
By symmetry, the optimal investment strategy for provider j is given by
qj = φj(D) =
γ
2τθ
(α1 + α2(1−D)) , (A6)
27The strategy is said to be Markovian since it does not change over time, i.e., it is qi(t) = φi(D(t)). A
non-Markovian strategy would appear as qi(t) = φi(D(t), t) .
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implying that the quality diﬀerence at time t is given by
qi − qj =
γα2
θτ
µ
D − 1
2
¶
. (A7)
Notice that quality of provider i is higher than quality of provider j if demand is lower than half
of the market (assuming α2 < 0).
Substituting qi = φi(D), qj = φj(D) and V iD(D) = α1 + α2D into (A4), we obtain
ρV i(D) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
T + pD − θ2
γ2
(2τθ)2
(α1 + α2D)
2 − β2D2
+(α1 + α2D) γ
¡
1
2 +
γα2
2τ2θ
¡
D − 12
¢
−D
¢
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
. (A8)
For the above equality to hold, the parameters must satisfy the following equations:
ρα0 −
γα1
2
− T + γ
2α21
8θτ2
+
γ2α1α2
4θτ2
= 0, (A9)µ
γα1 − p−
γα2
2
+ ρα1 +
γ2α22
4θτ2
− γ
2α1α2
4θτ2
¶
D = 0, (A10)µ
β
2
+ γα2 +
ρα2
2
− 3γ
2α22
8θτ2
¶
D2 = 0. (A11)
From (A11), solving for α2, we obtain two candidate solutions:
α2 =
2τθτ2
3γ2
Ã
2γ + ρ±
r
(2γ + ρ)2 +
3βγ2
θτ2
!
. (A12)
The condition that the value function be concave leads us to select the negative root. From
(A10) we have
α1 =
p+ γα22
¡
1− γα2
2θτ2
¢
γ + ρ− γ24θτ2α2
. (A13)
In order to establish the sign of α1, notice that the numerator in (A13) is monotonically increas-
ing in α2.28 Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that ∂α2∂ρ > 0 and
∂α2
∂β < 0. An interior
solution requires that price is higher than marginal production costs. Thus, α2 approaches its
lowest permissible value if ρ→ 0 and β → 2p. In this case, α2 = 2θτ2
2−
t
4+ 6p
θτ2
3γ , and the numer-
28 ∂

p+ γα2
2

1− γα2
2θτ2

∂α2
= 1
2
γ θτ
2−γα2
θτ2 > 0.
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ator of (A13) is given by 19
µ
3p+ θτ2
µ√
2
q
2 + 3pθτ2 − 2
¶¶
, which is unambiguously positive.
Thus, we conclude that α1 is positive for all permissible parameter configurations.
In the steady state Ds = 1/2, so that
qi =
γ
2τθ
³
α1 +
α2
2
´
,
which, after substitution of α1, leads to
qCL =
Ã
1
1 + ργ −
γα2
4θτ2
!Ã
p− β2
2τθ
!
, (A14)
where α2 < 0 is given by the negative root in (A12).
The comparative statics properties of (A14) are given by
∂qCL
∂γ
=
3ρ (2γ + ρ+ 5ψ)
³
p− β2
´
(4γ + 5ρ+ ψ)2 τθψ
> 0 (A15)
and
∂qCL
∂τ
= −
³
p− β2
´ h
(2γ + ρ)2 + ψ (4γ + 5ρ)
i
3γ
⎡
⎢⎣
θτ2ψ
h
(4γ + 5ρ)2 + ψ2
i
+ 24βγ3
+2θτ2
¡
16γ3 + 5ρ3
¢
+ 24θτ2γρ (3γ + 2ρ)
⎤
⎥⎦
< 0, (A16)
where
ψ :=
r
(2γ + ρ)2 +
3βγ2
θτ2
.
28
Figure 1. Equilibrium is a saddle point
q dD/dt=0
dq/dt=0
DD(0) D(0)1/2
Figure 2. Increase in price or reduction in travel costs (more competition)
q dD/dt=0
dq/dt’=0
dq/dt=0
D1/2
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